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HIGH PRIESTS AND LOWLY
PHILOSOPHERS: THE BATTLE FOR THE
SOUL OF ECONOMICS
Peter J. Boettke
Christopher J. Coyne
Peter T Leesont
"Do not pry into things too hard for you
Or investigate what is beyond your reach.
Many have been led astray by their theorizing,
And evil imaginings have impaired their judgments.
Stubbornness will come to a bad end,
And he who flirts with danger will lose his life.
When calamity befalls the arrogant, there is no cure;
Wickedness is too deeply rooted in them."
- Ecclesiasticus 3: 21, 24-26, 28
"God, grant me the serenity
To accept the things I cannot change,
Courage to change the things I can,
and wisdom to know the difference."
- The Serenity Prayer by Reinhold Niebuhr penned in 1943
I. INTRODUCTION
In his book, Reaching for Heaven on Earth,1 Robert Nelson estab-
lished that modem economics had indeed taken on a theological sig-
nificance that was denied other social sciences and policy-relevant
disciplines. This claim is worthy of serious attention, but Nelson's
route to this conclusion is interesting in its own right. In writing about
t Peter J. Boettke, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
22032. Christopher Coyne, Department of Economics, Hampden-Sydney College, Hampden-
Sydney, VA 23943. Peter Leeson, Department of Economics, West Virginia University, Mor-
gantown, WV 26506. We acknowledge the financial support of the Mercatus Center and the
Program in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at the James M. Buchanan Center for Political
Economy. The usual caveat applies.
I ROBERT H. NELSON, REACHING FOR HEAVEN ON EARTH (1991).
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the role of economists in government, Nelson argued that economists
do not limit their advice to technical expertise. Instead, they use their
positions as economic advisors to strongly advocate particular pro-
grams. In short, they do not just discuss the means-ends efficiency of
a proposed policy independent of their own value assessment of that
policy, but rather infuse their economic advice-giving with their own
values. The economic way of thinking is a powerful tool for organiz-
ing and interpreting events, and may well be value neutral; but
economists as advisors are definitely not value neutral.
This conclusion led Nelson to ponder why it is then that econo-
mists are given a privileged position in the policy arena. Why are
other disciplines that also provide a useful framework for thinking
about important problems not afforded the same public hearing on
issues of public policy? Nelson reasoned that since the economic way
of thinking provides a way for us to understand and legitimate our
modem world, perhaps economics has become the modem theology
that has replaced traditional theology as the set of doctrines that give
meaning to our social reality and hope to our endeavors for improving
our lives. At least that is what Nelson sought to explore in his 1991
book, and to amazing effect. Since economic progress was seen as the
solution to social ills, the discipline of economics is awarded a special
status as the harbinger of progress and its practitioners are trans-
formed from lowly philosophers, who only study the world, to high
priests of social control, who are responsible for ushering in an age of
unlimited progress and prosperity.2
In Economics as Religion,3 Robert Nelson develops this line of ar-
gument even further and explores the theological underpinnings of
such economic luminaries as Frank Knight and Paul Samuelson. The
history of twentieth-century economics, in fact, could be read as how
it came to be that Knight's Calvinistic economics was rejected in fa-
vor of Samuelson's secular religion of scientific management.4 In
2 Nelson's work should not be read as an indictment of economics in the least. All that he
is attempting to show is that economists do not practice a form of value-free analysis, and, in
fact, cannot practice value-freedom when they offer policy guidance. Moreover, rather than aflippant critique of economics, Nelson actually engaged in historical research to demonstrate
that many of the founding fathers of political economy and economics had deep theological
commitments. They used the intellectual constructs from their theology to construct their eco-
nomics, and they spoke of the discipline of economics itself and its policy advice in messianic
terms. For a discussion of the relationship between value-neutral economics and value-relevant
political economy, see Peter Boettke, Is Economics a Moral Science?, I J. MARKETS & MORAL-ITY 212-19 (1998) (arguing that economists can provide value-relevant knowledge grounded in
value-neutral analysis); Peter Boettke, Why Are There No Austrian Socialists? Ideology, Science
and the Austrian School, 17 J. HIST. OF ECON. THOUGHT 35-56 (1995).
3 ROBERT H. NELSON, ECONOMICS AS RELIGION: FROM SAMUELSON TO CHICAGO AND
BEYOND (2001).
4 Despite his severe criticism of religion, Knight could not escape his background in
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fact, Nelson5 demonstrates how Samuelson's claims to scientific
value-freedom are merely rhetorical flourish. Instead, Samuelson's
ideas are the logical outgrowth of the intellectual movement of
American Progressivism in which government, in seeking to create
the Kingdom of God on earth, must act as a corrective to social ills,
such as unemployment, and plan the social order. Guided by the
teachings of scientific management, the practice of public administra-
tion promised not just efficiency in public affairs but to be morally
uplifting as well. Thus, the liberal state would be transformed by sci-
ence to become the administrative state with the goal of eradicating
social ills. Samuelson, according to Nelson, must be seen as providing
the "scientific blessing for the American welfare and regulatory
state."6
Building on Nelson's analysis, we contend that the transformation
of economics from a discipline that studies the economy to one that is
entrusted with its control has threatened the very "soul" of economics.
The false pretense of scientific management led economists to prom-
ise to accomplish tasks that they cannot legitimately achieve. False
theory combined with bad philosophy generated scientific claims that
must now be rejected. But this does not mean that economics as a
way of thinking about the world and organizing its facts must be re-
jected. Quite to the contrary, the teachings of economics are neces-
sary for understanding the complexities of social reality. Perhaps its
two most important public roles are (1) to explain how within a spe-
cific set of institutional arrangements the power of self-interest can
spontaneously generate patterns of social order that simultaneously
achieve individual autonomy, generalized prosperity, and social peace
and (2) through means-ends analysis, to provide parameters on peo-
ple's utopian notions of economic policy. 7 The first captures the di-
dactic role of the economist in teaching the nuances of Adam Smith's
Christian thought. For Knight, as in earlier Christian theology, private property and the market
economy exist because of original sin. Prior to the fall of man neither would be necessary and
thus in an ideal world they would not exist either. But in the imperfect world we live in, prop-
erty and markets serve to counter the natural proclivity of fallen man to strive for power and
advantage over other men. Property and markets may be an imperfect solution, but they are
better than the alternatives. See id at 136-37.
5 Jd. at 37-48.
6 Id. at 263.
1 See James M. Buchanan, Economics as a Public Science, in FOUNDATIONS OF RE-
SEARCH IN ECONOMICS 30-36 (Steven G. Medema & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1996). Buchanan
argues that the task of economics as a public science is to provide an understanding of the work-
ings of an organized economy to citizens and the consequences of alternative interventions into
that working economy so that these citizens can be informed participants in the democratic
process. In Buchanan's way of thinking, economists must differentiate between the analysis of
what is, what could be, and what ought to be in performing their task of providing citizens with
the information required to make intelligent democratic decisions.
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"invisible hand" and the second captures the contribution that eco-
nomics as a technical discipline can offer to public policy discourse.
When economists move beyond these roles and instead try to employ
economics as the primary tool for social control, they run afoul and
distort the teachings of the discipline.
We provide three cases in which the scientistic pretensions of
economists got the better of them in the twentieth century: Keynesian
demand management, the practice of cost-benefit analysis by regula-
tors and lawyers, and the debate over market socialism. If our argu-
ment is right, the role of the economist should move from high priest
back to lowly philosopher. In taking this "demotion," economists may
find it harder to justify their employment, but the discipline and those
who practice it will also regain their "soul" as they reject the false god
of scientism and its pretensions of social engineering.
II. KEYNESIAN DEMAND MANAGEMENT
There has always been a subculture in the discipline of political
economy that argued that the practitioner of political economy could
be entrusted to devise schemes of social control that would outper-
form the "accidental" outcomes of laissez-faire. Thomas Malthus and
J.B. Say exchanged words in the early nineteenth century over the
issue of whether or not a market economy would generate "gluts" or
whether the market is a self-regulating mechanism that would tend
toward equilibrium when aggregate supply and aggregate demand are
equated.8 The majority of economists sided with Say and maintained
that this self-regulating aspect of a market economy was one of the
most powerful principles taught by the discipline of economics. Nev-
ertheless, the debate over self-regulation did not cease. Karl Marx's
writings on the inherent tendency of the capitalist system to lead to
monopoly on the one hand, and suffer periodic crises on the other,
were direct challenges to the vulgar teachings of political economy
that taught self-regulation.
By the late nineteenth century, laissez-faire was increasingly under
attack as both a scientific and public policy doctrine. J.S. Mill may
have given theoretical presumption to the laissez-faire principle, but
the exceptions to that principle that he articulated, which called for
direct government action, were vast.9 Political careers were built on
the claim that monopoly power needed to be reigned in, and business
fluctuations had to be controlled through public policy. In the United
8 The letters from J.B. Say to Malthus were collected and published in 1821.
9 J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 941-79 (Augustus M. Kelley 1976)
(1848).
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States, antitrust legislation was introduced along with the establish-
ment of the institutions of public administration to oversee the im-
plementation and enforcement of this legislation. The banking system
was also transformed in an effort to eliminate "panics."
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the dominant school of
economic thinking in the United States was critical of the unrealistic
political economy of classical economics and advocated an institu-
tional economics that denied any universal laws of economics and
demanded a more activist government to regulate and control the
economy and promote efficiency and social justice. Of course, there
were pockets of defenders of classical political economy, and even
more practitioners of the new science of neoclassical economics; but
the Progressive era marshaled in the intellectual domination of the
institutional school of economic thought. This domination was not
limited to the teachings of economics, but permeated law schools and
the budding discipline of public administration.
When the Great Crash of 1929 turned into the Great Depression of
the 1930s, the remaining voices for laissez-faire were silenced.
Economists who had held the classical position were either ignored or
they changed their song to be more in tune with the times. Govern-
ment had to do something to address social ills. Of course, some eco-
nomic research argued that the Great Depression was caused by gov-
ernment policy failures-a credit expansion of the 1920s generated a
boom-bust cycle, and government interventions in the 1930s (most
notably trade restrictions) hampered the ability of the market adjust-
ment process to work to eliminate the crisis. But this message was
ignored. Instead, the message that resonated with policy-makers, the
public, and a new generation of economists was that laissez-faire
capitalism was prone to monopoly and business cycles as revealed in
the Robber Baron age, the fraud perpetrated on consumers by poor
products, the exploitation of workers in factories, and the indignity of
unemployment as experienced in the 1930s. It was the job of the
economists to address these social ills with the tools of the discipline
and the expertise of public administration.
Keynesian economics filled this demand perfectly. John Maynard
Keynes's work, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money, l0 provided a critique of the classical model of self-regulation
of markets, a diagnosis of why the economies of Great Britain and the
U.S. had entered a depression, and policy advice on how to alleviate
the problems of unemployment and instability. For the sake of this
10 JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1964) (1936).
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discussion, what matters most are the general ideas behind this prom-
ise. Keynes argued that investment was unstable because it was based
on the volatile expectations of investors and their moods of optimism
and pessimism.
In addition, Keynes argued that the introduction of money into an
economic system repudiated the classical law of markets that main-
tained self-regulation. Prices were not linked to the supply and de-
mand for money anymore than investment was determined by the in-
terest rate in the modem economy, according to Keynes. The
introduction of expectations into economic analysis ruptures the old
relationships that were established in classical economics. For exam-
ple, during a recession, because of expectations that the economy is
caught in a liquidity trap, attempts to get out of that trap through a
monetary policy stimulus will be ineffective. If investment is not ra-
tional, but instead based on "animal spirits," then private markets
cannot be relied upon to assess the marginal efficiency of capital allo-
cations among competing projects. Finally, in the economy so de-
scribed by Keynes, resources can remain idle and not be reemployed
in alternative uses. The automatic adjustments that classical econom-
ics assumed do not come into operation because the economy can get
stuck in an unemployment equilibrium. By definition, an equilibrium
is a point where no one in the system has any incentive or inclination
to move from their current position. To move out of that equilibrium,
a force outside the system must be introduced. Keynes forcefully ar-
gued that government was the entity that could most effectively affect
social change.
As Roger Garrison has argued, Keynesian economics is the
income-expenditure Keynesianism of basic textbook economics."
This simple model served as the basic tool for understanding
Keynesian public policy for a generation of economists. And it was a
staple of Samuelson's presentation in his Economics.12 In fact, the
Keynesian shift from analytical perspective to social philosophy is
embodied in Samuelson's classic textbook. In the 1948 edition, for
example, Samuelson does not introduce basic supply and demand
until page 44713 precisely because of the notion that microeconomic
principles only become effective after one has ensured that the
macroeconomic system is in balance. Left to its own devices, the
capitalist system will suffer from aggregate demand failure and
results in an unemployment equilibrium. It is the economist's task to
11 ROGER GARRISON, TIME AND MONEY (2001).
12 PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 225-79 (McGraw-Hill 1st ed., 1948).
" Id. at 447.
556 [Vol. 56:3
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engineer this full employment equilibrium, at which point the self-
regulating tendencies of a market economy may be relied upon in
situations in which externalities are absent, production and exchange
is limited to private goods (and not public goods), and the market
structure is deemed competitive.
For our story, the significant point to recognize is how Keynes's
General Theory and later Samuelson's Economics reverse the pre-
sumption of Mill's Principles. With Mill, the presumption was still
with laissez-faire and the exceptions he enumerated justify the inter-
ventions of government into the economy. But by the time we get to
Keynes and then Samuelson, the presumption is that government
must intervene at all times to maintain economic civilization and that
only in certain circumstances could the laissez-faire principle be re-
lied upon.14 In addition, it is important to realize the changing role of
economists that this shift in presumption requires. At the time of Mill,
the economist could still take the stance of student of society, but by
the time we get to Keynes and Samuelson the economist's task is to
assume the role of society's savior utilizing the scientific tools of his
craft to maintain societal balance and right social wrongs.' 5 "Where
the complex economic conditions of life necessitate social coordina-
14 To put a fine point on this, Samuelson wrote:
No longer is modern man able to believe "that government governs best which
governs least." In a frontier society, when a man moved farther west as soon as he
could hear the bark of his neighbor's dog, there was some validity to the view "let
every man paddle his own canoe." But today, in our vast interdependent society, the
waters are too crowded to make unadulterated "rugged individualism" tolerable.
Id. at 152. Samuelson, in the next paragraph, admits that this system of "rugged individualism"
led to rapid material progress, but he quickly adds that it also resulted in business cycles, the
wasteful exhaustion of resources, income inequality, political corruption by moneyed interests,
and the substitution of "self-regulating competition in favor of all-consuming monopoly." Id.
15 For an examination of the economist and the economic role of the state, see Peter
Boettke & Steve Horwitz, The Limits of Economic Expertise: Prophets, Engineers and the State
in the History of Development Economics (George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr., Global Property
Initiative, Working Paper 31, 2004), available at http://www.mercatus.org/
globalprosperity/article.PHP/778.html. Though different terms are employed in this article, the
basic idea is that there are only two stable intellectual equilibria: (1) economist as student and
state as referee of the economic game and (2) economist as savoir and state as active player in
the economic game. The classical argument preached humility to economists and sought to
constrain the abuse of power by the state and its agents; the modern argument preached activism
and the need for agents of the state to use the power of the government to actively intervene on
behalf of the people. The classical argument warned of the perversity of unintended
consequences in government interventions, whereas the modem argument warned of the
perversity of voluntary choice due to monopoly, externalities, public goods, and macroeconomic
instability. The classical argument tended to push us to the student/referee equilibrium, while
the modern argument tended to push us to the savoir/player equilibrium. The puzzle for a
contemporary of political economy that finds the humility argument of the classics persuasive is
whether an argument that satisfies the modem mind can be made that leads to the
student/referee equilibrium. This intellectual puzzle is separate from the material self-interest
puzzle of how one would get economists to give up on an argument that privileges them in the
public policy discourse.
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tion and planning," Samuelson wrote, "there can sensible men of
good will be expected to invoke the authority and creative activity of
government."' 
6
Ludwig von Mises and F.A. Hayek were two of the strongest crit-
ics of this Keynesian transformation of the discipline of economics.
Mises tended to stress the logical fallacies committed by Keynesian
economics,' 7 whereas Hayek tended to stress the heroic assumptions
made on behalf of economists put in the position of engineering social
change through macroeconomic modeling. 18 For the income-
expenditure model to work, the economist-engineer must know the
aggregate level of current consumption, investment, and public
spending, as well as what the full employment level of output would
be. He must also know the precise manner in which the multiplier
effect will work to translate an increase in government expenditures
into an increase in aggregate demand to achieve that full employment
level of output. Each step of the analysis presupposes that the detailed
knowledge of economic life is readily available to the macroecono-
mist and that each policy step advocated will result in the precise ef-
fect on economic activity that is intended to achieve economic bal-
ance at full employment levels. In short, the model assumes what it
has to prove.
Moreover, macroeconomic theories tended to mask the real eco-
nomic data that human actors use in forming their economic plans.
Macroeconomic public policy is both mistaken and arrogant. Hayek
argued that the "pretense of knowledge" evident in macroeconomic
modeling resulted not in the solution of social ills, such as unem-
ployment, but instead in a pattern of resource employment that cannot
be maintained. As Hayek stated:
What this policy has produced is not so much a level of em-
ployment that could not have been bought about in other
ways, as a distribution of employment which cannot be in-
definitely maintained and which after some time can be main-
tained only by a rate of inflation which would rapidly lead to
a disorganization of all economic activity. 19
The collapse of the Keynesian hegemony in the 1970s reflected the
intellectual victory of Hayek's critique of Keynes. Most economists,
16 SAMUELSON, supra note 12, at 153.
17 LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION 710-803 (1949).
18 F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY
OF IDEAS 98-100 (1978).
19 Id. at 29.
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however, have not followed Hayek's plea for humility and the attempt
to understand economic life in aggregate terms continues. The resur-
rection of Keynesian economics in the hands of Joseph Stiglitz20 and
Paul Krugman" requires the same heroic assumptions about the
power of economists to fine-tune the world with the levers of eco-
nomic policy that was evident in the Keynes/Samuelson era despite
subtle shifts in the theoretical argument. As Robert Nelson indicated,
Stiglitz has pointed out that the theoretical underpinnings of
Samuelson's economics contained fundamental misconceptions that
are now well understood.22 But Samuelson's work established the
scientific status of economics in American society and provided many
economists with government jobs in which they could use their scien-
tific authority to influence public policy.
Even though Stiglitz understands the faulty foundations of
Samuelsonian economics, he does not suggest that the revolution of
information economics that he led, or the institutional economics as-
sociated with Coase and North, or the public choice revolution led by
Buchanan and Tullock, should lead to a questioning of the position of
economists in society that Samuelson's work established. If anything,
Stiglitz believes that his contribution to modem economics has justi-
fied the role of the economists in society as redefined by Keynes and
Samuelson even more so than in their own writings. The faith in the
saving power of public administration guided by economic models
does not die easily.
III. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The new economics as embodied in Samuelson, was predicated on
the following three propositions.
Prop. 1: The laissez-faire presumption has been reversed by the
economics of Keynes and the development of economics since
Keynes.
Prop. 2: Modem economics has provided the analytical toolkit for
economists to assume the role of scientist cum social engineer.
Prop. 3: The analytical toolkit of modem economics is aided by
new statistical measuring techniques that guarantee that abstract
mathematical economic models can be accurately calibrated, generate
clear predictions, be cleanly tested against the data, and thus provide
the basis for successful economic policy initiatives.
20 JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002).
21 PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS (1999).
22 See NELSON, supra note 3, at 261.
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In order for these propositions to work, we must assume that ob-
jective data exists and can be collected and analyzed in an economical
manner. Obviously the development of computing power in the twen-
tieth century had a major influence on the manner in which econom-
ics is done, but that is not the side of the story we want to emphasize.
The point we want to highlight is more subtle; economists have to
assume that certain data exist for them to manipulate, which we con-
tend does not in fact exist.23 In the case this section analyzes, the data
assumed is the objectivity of costs and benefits.
Cost-benefit analysis permeates the field of public economics. It is
not only the cornerstone of analyses of externalities, but also analyses
of taxation, regulation, and alternative legal arrangements. The mod-
em field of law and economics, for example, would be unrecogniz-
able if cost-benefit analysis were rejected.
Conceptually, the economic way of thinking has no problem with
the logic of cost-benefit analysis. The problem is when one tries to
operationalize the analysis by assuming that costs and benefits are
quantifiable entities that can be measured and compared. In standard
Pigouvian welfare economics, deviations from the ideal allocation of
resources result because of external economies. Private marginal
benefits/marginal costs deviate from the social marginal benefits/
marginal costs. A positive externality is said to lead to an under sup-
ply of the good or service in question because the private marginal
benefits from producing the good or service are less than the social
marginal benefits it would produce. A negative externality generates
the opposite problem. Undesirable goods and services are supplied
beyond their ideal level because the private marginal costs of produc-
23 This is true for macroeconomics as well as the microeconomic questions we are going
to address in this section. Gross Domestic Product, for example, attempts to measure the value
produced in an economy in a given year by adding up the final good prices. There are sophisti-
cated attempts made to avoid double counting, etc., but the entire enterprise faces an even more
daunting problem. In order for the addition of these final good prices to have any meaning, the
analyst must assume they are in fact the equilibrium prices that reflect the full opportunity cost
of production for each good. But that would be true only if the conditions of general competitive
equilibrium held true. First, the conditions of general competitive equilibrium are highly restric-
tive and one could argue that they are never approximated in the real world. Second, if the con-
ditions of general competitive equilibrium were said to hold true, then the sort of policy designs
advocated by the Keynesian macroeconomist would be redundant, as the ideal equilibrium
allocation of scarce resources would already be obtained. In short, by definition, the sort of idle
resource argument of Keynesians presupposes the absence of general competitive equilibrium.
If that is the case then the price data would not be able to be added in any meaningful sense to
provide the basis for public policy decisions. To get meaningful data, the Keynesian economist
has to assume the existence of data, which, if it did exist, would mean that Keynesian policy
solutions are unnecessary. The fact that in the face of such a logical conundrum the Keynesian
ascendancy occurred almost unchallenged demonstrates Nelson's point about the victory of faith
over reason in modem political economy, and how once ideas and interests align how difficult it
is to overturn a belief system.
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ing the good or service is less than the social marginal costs the good
or service generates. In the standard drill, in the case of positive ex-
ternalities, the government should subsidize the production of the
good and service so as to bring the private and social costs into
alignment, whereas in the case of negative externalities, the govern-
ment should tax the activity so as to again bring about the alignment
of private and social costs. Conceptually, the logic of this approach is
unassailable; but as a tool for public policy, it is about as misguided
as one could get and it has done tremendous damage to the way that
economic discourses of public policy issues are conducted.24
Ronald Coase 25 and James Buchanan 26 pointed out the fundamen-
tal problems with Pigouvian welfare economics long ago. Their work
was revolutionary, but the most radical implications of their work
were ignored in subsequent years as the culture of economics became
one deeply committed to the analysis and measurement of data. Sci-
ence, after all, is measurement, as everyone likes to say. And if you
cannot measure, measure anyway rather than threaten the scientific
stature of a discipline. So despite the profound insights of Coase and
Buchanan, cost-benefit analysis is far from being abandoned by prac-
titioners of political economy-many of whom actually profess alle-
giance to Coase and Buchanan.
The Coase/Buchanan critique of Pigou can be summarized in the
following manner. Either Pigouvian solutions are redundant because
private actors would negotiate away the conflicts (in the case of zero
transaction costs), or the Pigouvian solution is nonoperational (in the
case of positive transaction costs, including information costs). If pri-
vate actors are unable to glean the costs and benefits and bring them
into alignment, then how are government officials to do so? Rather
than measure that which we cannot reasonably assume we can meas-
ure, both Coase and Buchanan advocate an opportunity cost approach
to public economics. The comparative institutional analysis that such
an approach leads to would, as Coase put it, "start our analysis with a
situation approximating that which actually exists, to examine the
24 The economic policy "think tank" world is divided into pro-market and anti-market
forces and the dialogue between them is one of warring cost-benefit analyses. The pro-market
groups show that the costs of this or that intervention will exceed the benefits and this is usually
communicated by the cost to the average family of four. The anti-market forces, not to be out-
done, respond by providing "evidence" that an unhampered market economy will generate costs
to average citizens well in excess of the benefits generated in the market. This is the way the
discourse proceeds, but neither of them actually has the data to make the argument they want to
make, so they make assumptions and guess. At best, what we get is ideological commitments
wrapped in numbers and disguised in the trappings of science. At worst, all we get is the ma-
nipulations by vested interests to achieve their political goals at the expense of others.
25 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
26 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE (1969).
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effects of a proposed policy change and to attempt to decide whether
the new situation would be, in total, better or worse than the original
one."
27
The blackboard economics of Pigou, caught as it is in the logical
contradiction of being either redundant or nonoperational, remains
hard to abandon. 28 William Baumol, for example, vehemently resisted
the implications of Coase and Buchanan and argued that the Pigou-
vian tradition was "impeccable" even while admitting that "[a]ll in
all, we are left with little reason for confidence in the applicability of
the Pigouvian approach, literally interpreted. We do not know how to
calculate the required taxes and subsidies and we do not know how to
approximate them by trial and error., 29 Baumol's intellectual dance
led Coase to pen one of the most stinging indictments of modem eco-
nomics when, after summing up Baumol's position that the logic of
the Pigouvian approach was "impeccable" if by "impeccable" one
meant that "if its taxation proposals were carried out, which they can-
not be, the allocation of resources would be optimal."3 ° Coase added:
"This I have never denied. My point was simply that such tax propos-
als are the stuff that dreams are made of. In my youth it was said that
what was too silly to be said may be sung. In modem economics it
may be put into mathematics.'
IV. THE DEBATE OVER MARKET SOCIALISM
The debate over market socialism in the first half of the twentieth
century provides another stark example in which economists let pre-
tensions of scientism get the better of them. In the years leading up to
1920, Friedrich von Wieser, Joseph Schumpeter, Leon Walras,
Vilfredo Pareto, Enrico Barone, Fredrick Taylor, and Frank Knight all
pointed out that if socialism was to rationalize production, it would
have to succeed in satisfying the same formal requirements that capi-
talism was said to achieve under conditions of equil"ibrium. 32 In other
words, if rationalization implied the most efficient use of resources,
which is the meaning it would have to have, then socialist rationaliza-
27 Coase, supra note 25, at 23.
28 See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 157-85 (1988) (elaborating
further on the contradiction of Pigouvian welfare economics).
29 William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
307, 318 (1972).
30 COASE, supra note 28, at 185.
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., 4 SOCIALISM AND THE MARKET: THE SOCIALIST CALCULATION DEBATE RE-
VISITED (Peter Boettke ed., 2000) (containing papers on this "formal similarity" argument and
the subsequent attempts to develop a marginalist economics of socialism).
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tion would need to satisfy the optimality conditions that are described
using marginalist principles.
The Polish economist, Oskar Lange, rose to this challenge in
1936-1937 with a proposal for "market socialism" that not only satis-
fied the formal requirements of capitalism in general equilibrium, but
was argued to actually perform better than the market economy by
wiping out monopoly and business cycles believed to plague real-
world capitalism. 33 In deploying the formal similarity argument,
Lange provided the following blueprint. First, allow a market for con-
sumer goods and labor allocation. Second, put the productive sector
into state hands but provide strict guidelines for production to firms.
Namely, inform managers that they must price their output equal to
marginal costs, and produce that level of output that minimizes aver-
age costs. Adjustments can be made on a trial-and-error basis, using
inventory as the signal. The production guidelines will ensure that the
full opportunity cost of production will be taken into account and that
all least-cost technologies will be employed. In short, these produc-
tion guidelines will assure productive efficiency is achieved even in a
setting of state ownership of the means of production.
Lange went even further in his argument for socialism. Not only is
socialism, by mimicking the efficiency conditions of capitalism, able
to theoretically achieve the same level of efficient production as the
market, but it would actually outperform capitalism by purging soci-
ety of monopoly and business cycles that plague real-world capital-
ism. 34 In the hands of Lange, neoclassical theory was to become a
powerful tool of social control.
Hayek's response to Lange's model for market socialism was
multi-pronged and attacked its informational assumptions rooted in
the neoclassical model of general equilibrium.35 First, Hayek argued
that the models of market socialism proposed by Lange and others
reflected a preoccupation with equilibrium. The models possessed no
ability to discuss the necessary adaptations to changing conditions
required in real economic life. The imputation of value to capital
goods from consumer goods represented a classic case in point. Jo-
seph Schumpeter had argued that once consumer goods were valued
in the market (as they would be in Lange's model), a market for pro-
ducer goods was unnecessary because we could impute the value of
corresponding capital goods ipsofacto.36
33 Id.
3 id.
35 id.
36 id.
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This "solution" was of course accurate in the model of general
equilibrium in which there is a pre-reconciliation of plans (i.e., no
false trades). Hayek's concern, however, was not with the model, but
with how imputation actually takes place within the market process so
that production plans come to be coordinated with consumer de-
mands. This is not a trivial procedure and requires various market
signals to guide entrepreneurs in their decision processes on the use of
capital-good combinations in production projects. In a fundamental
sense, Hayek was arguing that market socialism could not answer this
problem by assuming it away. Of course, if we focus our analytical
attention on the properties of a world in which all plans have already
been fully coordinated (general competitive equilibrium), then the
process by which that coordination came about in the first place will
not be highlighted.
This was Hayek's central point. Absent certain institutions and
practices, the process that brings about the coordination of plans (in-
cluding the imputation of value from consumer goods to producer
goods) would not take place. Some alternative process would have to
be relied upon for decision-making concerning resources, and that
process would by necessity be one that could not rely on the guides of
private property incentives, relative price signals, and profit/loss ac-
counting since the socialist project had explicitly abolished them. In
other words, the ipso facto proposition of competitive equilibrium
was irrelevant for the world outside of that state of equilibrium. The
fact that leading neoclassical economists (like Knight and Schum-
peter) had not recognized this elementary point demonstrated the
havoc that a scientistic preoccupation with the state of equilibrium, as
opposed to the process that tends to bring about equilibrium, can have
on economics.
In Hayek's view, the problem with concentrating on a state of af-
fairs as opposed to the process was not limited to assuming that which
must be argued, but directed attention away from how changing cir-
cumstances require adaptations on the part of participants. As we
noted above, equilibrium, by definition, is a state of affairs in which
no agent within the system has any incentive to change. If all the data
were frozen, then indeed the logic of the situation would lead indi-
viduals to a state of rest in which all plans were coordinated and re-
sources were used in the most efficient manner currently known. The
Lange conditions would hold-prices would be set to marginal cost
(and thus the full opportunity cost of production would be reflected in
the price) and production would be at the minimum point on the
firm's average cost curve (and thus the least-cost technologies would
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be employed). But what, Hayek asked, do these conditions tell us
about a world where the data are not frozen? What happens when
tastes and technologies change?
Effective allocation of resources requires that there is a correspon-
dence between the underlying conditions of tastes, technology, and
resource endowments, and the induced variables of prices and profit-
and-loss accounting. In perfect competition, the underlying variables
and the induced variables are in perfect alignment and thus there are
no coordination problems. Traditions in economic scholarship that
reject the self-regulation proposition tend to deny that there is any
correspondence between the underlying conditions and the induced
variables on the market.
Hayek, in contrast to both of these alternatives, sought to explain
the lagged relationship between the underlying and the induced. Eco-
nomics for him is a discipline of tendency and direction, not a science
of exact determination. Changes in the underlying conditions set in
motion accommodating adjustments that are reflected in the induced
variables on the market. The induced variables lag behind, but are
continually pulled towards the underlying conditions.
Hayek argued that perfect knowledge is a defining characteristic of
equilibrium but cannot be an assumption within the process of equili-
bration. The question instead is how do individuals come to learn the
information that is necessary for them to coordinate their plans with
others? In Economics and Knowledge37 and The Use of Knowledge in
Society,38 Hayek develops the argument that how economic agents
come to learn represents the crucial empirical element of economics
and that price signals represent the key institutional guidepost for
learning within the market process. Traditional neoclassical theory
taught that prices were incentive devices, which they indeed are. But
Hayek pointed out that prices also serve an informational role, which
is overlooked by modern economists preoccupied with models of
equilibrium.
Hayek emphasized different aspects of the argument developed in
these two classic articles over his career and came to place particular
emphasis on the contextual nature of knowledge that is utilized within
the market process. Knowledge, he pointed out, does not exist disem-
bodied from the context of its discovery and use. Economic partici-
pants base their actions on concrete knowledge within a particular
time and place. This local knowledge that market participants utilize
in orienting their actions is simply not abstract and objective and thus
37 F.A. Hayek, Economics and Knowledge, 4 ECONOMICA 33 (1937).
38 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
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is incapable of being used by planners outside of that context to plan
the large-scale organization of society.
Hayek's reasoning for why planning cannot work is not limited to
the problem that the information required for the task of coordinating
the plans of a multitude of individuals is too vast to organize effec-
tively. The knowledge utilized within the market by entrepreneurs
does not exist outside that local context and thus cannot even be or-
ganized in principle. It is not that planners would face a complex
computational task; it is that they face an impossible task because the
knowledge required is not accessible to them no matter what techno-
logical developments may come along to ease the computational task.
Market socialism requires a shift in the discipline of economics
from understanding the workings of the economy to attempting to
plan the economy. The scientific tools of neoclassical economics-
most notably, general equilibrium-mislead socialist's proponents to
believe they can effectively plan. Economists are no longer students
of economy but become active players-engineers who plan eco-
nomic activity. Of course, as both history and Hayek's work demon-
strated, the position required by socialism is unsustainable in the long
run. Hayek theoretically devastated the socialist program with the
arguments discussed above. Most powerfully of all, however, the
dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the last dec-
ade revealed to the world the disaster wrought by economic hubris on
the part of those who believed they could centrally direct economic
life.
V. CONCLUSION
Robert Nelson's Economics as a Religion is not only a fascinating
read but also a profound work on the social role that economics has
come to serve in modem times. As he writes:
The most vital religion of the modem age has been economic
progress. If economists have had a modest impact in actually
generating this progress, or even understanding the actual
mechanisms by which it has occurred, they have had a large
role in giving it social legitimacy. They have been the modem
priesthood of the religion of progress, interpreting its forms,
refining its messages, and assuring the faithful that progress
would continue.39
39 NELSON, supra note 3, at 329.
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He goes on to state that we economists "like other priestly classes of
history, live a secure and protected existence, often in the groves of
the academy."'A'
Nelson limits his analysis mainly to the positive description of
how economic growth has become the modem religion and econo-
mists its priestly guardians. We jump off from his profound analysis
to look at the darker side of this transformation of our discipline. Us-
ing basic economic reasoning, we would expect a protected priestly
class to respond rationally to the incentives and abuse of their privi-
leged position and attempt to erect barriers to competitors. As econo-
mists, we ourselves are committed to the idea that economics as a
discipline is vital to understanding the forces that shape our world.
But we also believe that the priesthood status of our fellow econo-
mists has done severe damage to our discipline and in the long run
will delegitimize the teachings that economics offers.4'
We have focused on three areas in which economists in the twenti-
eth century sought to justify an expanded role for economists as social
engineers. In each instance, we have postulated that the argument
given by economists was unjustified. Economics as a discipline
would be better served by humility in the face of social complexity,
rather than attempting to stretch the discipline beyond what it is capa-
ble of achieving. Our argument is simple: if we demand of a disci-
pline something that it is incapable of doing, then intellectual re-
sources will be wasted in the attempt to provide the unobtainable.
Both type 1 and type 2 errors will be made in intellectual decision-
making as projects will be pursued that should have been rejected,
and worthy projects will be foregone.
Can the situation of economics be reversed? We do not know. We
know that if we argue that the situation is hopeless, we would in es-
sence be admitting that the situation is ideal, as Frank Knight be-
lieved. On the other hand, we also recognize that change requires a
bold intellectual entrepreneur to seize the opportunity and reorient the
discipline. The reorientation we are calling for, however, is one that
would reduce the prestige and power of the economists in modem
society. Entrepreneurial action is usually not set in motion when the
reward for the innovation is a reduction in relative status. On the other
hand, we have argued that if economists give up their privileged posi-
tion in society, they might regain their "soul." Perhaps the profit op-
portunity waiting to be seized by the economist cum intellectual en-
40 Id. at 332.
41 And this delegitimization will have huge negative consequences for society by clouding
the understanding of the principle of spontaneous order and the means/ends analysis that places
parameters on utopian aspirations by political entrepreneurs.
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trepreneur is the long-term legitimacy of the discipline of political
economy. In order to seize this legitimacy, the economist must forego
the false promises of a pseudo-scientific enterprise of modem eco-
nomics with its belief in efficient public administration guided by the
techniques of model and measure that have characterized economics
since Samuelson. Such an economist might face the wrath of his fel-
low economists in his own age. But one can hope that such an
economist, by preaching the wisdom of humility, will be honored to
be working in the tradition of political economy's intellectual giants,
such as Smith, Hume, Mises, Hayek, and Buchanan. It is only by re-
jecting his high priest status and embracing his position as a lowly
philosopher that the economist has an opportunity to save economics
from damnation due to arrogance. "For every one who exalts himself
will be humbled, but the one who humbles himself will be exalted.
42
42 Luke 14:11.
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